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MANPOWER UTILIZATION IN AEROSPACE
ELI GINzBERG*
INTRODUCTION
The conventional way to distinguish the segments of the American economy is
to separate the private profit-seeking sector from the governmental sector. Slightly
more detail would provide for nonprofit institutions, such as hospitals and colleges,
which operate under voluntary auspices. Since the beginning and particularly the
end of World War II another sector has emerged which is difficult to define and
delineate sharply. While it formally is part of the private profit-seeking sector, its
operations are largely determined by government, and it receives almost all of its
income from the sale of goods and services to government. This sector consists of
defense contractors, primarily engaged in production of aerospace and research
development. Finally, several specialized nonprofit institutions such as Rand, the
Research Analysis Corporation, and Mitre devote almost all of their efforts to work
which is related to defense.
In our economy, if competition is relatively free and unfettered, it will usually
result in a rational allocation of scarce resources and will facilitate the expansion
of firms which tend to be the more efficient producers. To the extent that a society
permits the consumer to dictate, the market largely decides which goods are produced
and in what number. It need act only to protect those without adequate income,
and to assure that goods and services essential to the community at large are available.
For the most part, the judgment of the market is accepted. This applies not only
to the way in which resources are distributed but also to the way in which they are
utilized.
Of course, the foregoing is an idealized picture of the American economy. It
has long been recognized that our economy is shot through with situations where
a few large companies exercise an overwhelming influence on the actions and
behavior of those from whom they buy and to whom they sell. Moreover, many
of our most important sectors operate under governmental controls which determine
the prices which they may charge and the profits they may earn.
What mechanisms, then, do exist to bring about an efficient distribution of scarce
resources in the defense industry?
SoME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
The Armed Forces have long depended on the private enterprise sector of the
economy for most of the goods which they use, both in peace and in war. Although
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the Navy operates a limited number of shipyards and the Army a limited number
of arsenals, the primary mission of these service establishments is that of research and
development and quality and cost control. This tradition helps to explain why the
Navy manufactured aircraft in World War I and why the Army has sought to
advance its explorations into space at the Redstone Arsenal. Nevertheless, the Armed
Forces have always looked to private enterprise for most of their procurement,
including their procurement of weaponry. Hence the question arises, what is new or
special about their relations to the aerospace companies?
The answer is both quantitative and structural. In the years preceding the
outbreak of World War II, the total expenditures of the Army and the Navy were
at a rate of approximately one billion dollars annually, out of a total of about $9
billion of federal expenditures when the gross national product averaged about
$9 billion. The comparable data for 1963 are: $53 billion expenditures for national
defense (with an additional $7 billion for atomic energy and space), out of a total
of $93 billion of federal expenditures, with a gross national product of $585 billion.'
These figures imply that prior to World War II, the economic impact of defense
spending was insignificant; it comprised a little more than one per cent of the
gross national product. Today it is almost ten per cent.
While we could find in our history some parallels to each of these circumstances
and conditions, together they represent a unique constellation. A few additional
figures will help to set the stage. About half of the expenditures of the Department of
Defense, which equal more than $50 billion annually, is for personnel and operations
and maintenance. Most of the remainder is devoted to procurement, including
contracts for research and development Of the $26 billion prime contract awards
in 1962, about $i9 billion went for "hard goods": aircraft, missiles systems, electronic
and communications systems, ships, tanks, weapons Roughly eighty per cent of
the $i9 billion was spent for the aircraft, missiles, and electronics.4
The last years have witnessed a marked drift in the relative expenditures of the
Department of Defense between end items and research, development, test and
evaluation (RDT&E). In 1956, these RDT&E awards accounted for less than
fourteen per cent of all prime contracts; in the last five years the proportion has
risen to between twenty-two and twenty-five per cent.5
These expenditures for defense and defense-related activities occurring a decade
after the end of the Korean hostilities and almost two decades after the end of
World War II, indicate that the relations that have come to be established between
the federal government and the aerospace companies may be unique. This con-
tention does not rest on size alone. The following characteristics attest to its validity.
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a) The federal government is increasingly purchasing research and development
potential rather than hardware, and in this it cannot guide its procurement by the
same rules and regulations that it has developed over the years for the purchase of
conventional weaponry.
b) The persistence of the Cold War means that the government must be con-
cerned not only about the procurement of a single item or weapons system but about
the maintenance of a total defense capability that can be sustained only through
continuing large-scale purchases.
c) The scientific and financial management of the current large-scale programs
that involve the rapid exploitation of new scientific ideas and technology are without
precedent.
d) The fact that the government lets the contracts and pays the bills inevitably
opens the decision-making processes to a large number of political considerations
and pressures.
e) Inherent in the strenuous efforts that are being made to advance the science
and art of weaponry is the fact that relatively little stability can be introduced into
contracting relationships between the government and the aerospace companies,
Large fluctuations in the value of their defense contracts is a characteristic of
aerospace companies.
II
SOME ECONOMIC PARAMETERS OF DEFENSE
There are several different ways of looking at the significance of defense procure-
ment for the economy. In terms of total sales of manufacturing companies, defense
production accounted for only somewhat over six per cent. The rate is over eight
per cent when we consider durable goods aloneY But the impact on particular in-
dustries, areas, and companies is very much greater. For instance, all ordnance pro-
duction and ninety-four per cent of aircraft production is for defense. The pro-
portion of total ship production for defense is about sixty per cent. And even in
such a basic civilian industry as electrical machinery about twenty per cent of total
output is for military purposes.7
With respect to regions and states, defense production is very heavily concentrated
in the Southwest and the West. Although most of the large industrial states of the
East and Middle West are engaged in defense production, including research and
development, the significance of this effort is much less than in the several western
states where it accounts in some states for one-quarter of all manufacturing employ-
ment. s
Another measure of the significance of defense contracts on particular sectors of
the economy is the fact that between one-fifth and one-third of the sales of such
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leading manufacturing companies outside of the aircraft industry as General Electric,
Westinghouse, Philco, Farm Machinery and Chemical, Minneapolis Honeywell, and
still others represents sales to the federal governmentY
One additional facet of the defense business should be briefly noted at this point.
In 1962 just under three-quarters of all prime contracts were let to ioo large corpora-
tions. Small businesses, which are defined as those having less than 5oo employees,
received somewhat less than one-fifth of all prime contracts awarded. Even when
allowance is made for the fact that small business receives a substantial number of
subcontracts, the extent to which defense work is concentrated in large organizations
is pronounced.1 °
These then are the parameters of defense procurement, particularly those defining
aerospace. And these are some of the implications that flow therefrom.
(a) The survival and profitability of the areospace companies are dependent
on new contracts from the government.
(b) The heavy concentration of the aerospace industry in a few areas makes
the economy of these areas very heavily dependent on new contracts.
(c) The sudden cancellation of large defense contracts can have a disastrous effect
on particular companies and communities.
(d) Since the determination of awards and, when necessary, the cancellation of
defense contracts, must be made by government officials, and since these decisions
frequently have a life or death influence on the economic future of particular groups,
it is inevitable that the officialdom will be subjected to a great deal of pressure from
which there is no full escape in a democratic society.
HI
SOME DimENsIONS OF MANPOWER IN AEROSPACE
At the outbreak of World War II total employment in the aircraft industry
amounted to slightly more than 6oooo. By the time the United States entered the
war it had risen to half a million, or roughly-an eight-fold increase in two years.
By the end of 1943 the total was approaching 1.5 million or a further three-fold in-
crease in two years and a 25-fold expansion in four years. By V-J Day the total had
shrunk to 325,000 and by 1948 a further decline had reduced it to about 235,000.
Thus, a decline of about eighty-five per cent had taken place in five years. By the
time of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea the total had climbed to 280,000; there-
after it grew rapidly, and reached about 8ooooo as the conflict neared its end. By
1957 the figure had crept upward to just short of 900,000. Since then, a slow but
steady decline has been taking place. By the end of I96i total employment in
the aircraft industry was about 67oooo.
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Within these general figures are some important qualitative changes. At the
height of the World War II expansion, nine out of every ten aircraft employees were
production workers. By the time of Korea, only seven of every ten workers were
in production; the ratio of engineering and technical personnel had increased sub-
stantially. By 1959 less than half of the work force were production workers. The
latest figures indicate a further decline; today the proportion is in the neighborhood
of forty per cent.P
The shift from long-run production of relatively simple aircraft to very short-run
production of highly complex jets, and the increasing stress on unique space-craft
and on research and development have been reflected in a marked increase in the
proportion of both technical and white collar personnel. Currently, technical per-
sonnel, including scientists and graduate engineers as well as draftsmen and engi-
neering aides, accounts for twenty-five per cent of the work force. The white collar
group below the managerial level accounts for almost the same proportion. The rest
are classified as in the management group. To recapitulate :13
Percentage
Management 12
Technical Personnel 25
White Collar 23
Production Workers 40
The rapid growth in the numbers of professional personnel employed in aerospace
companies is indicated by the following selective data. In 1954 the total number of
scientists and engineers was approximately 2z8,000; by 196o the total was about 65,ooo-
an increase of about 120 per cent. The number of engineers increased by about 135
per cent, but the increase in the number of scientists was considerably more rapid:
the most conspicuous was the fivefold increase in physicists and the fourfold increase
in mathematicians. These two groups combined increased from under 2,000 to
over 8,ooo in four years34 It is worth noting that roughly two-thirds of all scientists
and engineers in aerospace are employed in research and development' 5
We have already alluded to the extent to which employment in aerospace, and
in defense more broadly, is heavily concentrated in a relatively few states and regions.
With respect to manpower, we see that in 196o the three states that comprise the
Pacific region had an aerospace payroll of just under $1.9 billion out of the national
total industry payroll of about $4.6 billion, or roughly forty per cent. During the
preceding five years, a marked shift occurred in the rate of growth and decline of
the several regions: the proportion of total defense output produced by the in-
dustrial heartland of America-Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin-
was reduced by about twenty per cent, while the proportion produced by the Western
121 Id. at 65.
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states, particularly Colorado, increased threefold. The West Coast pushed its relative
share higher, as did New England, by about ten per cent.'
Another indication of heavy concentration of defense industry is the fact that
in two states, Washington and Kansas, employment in defense institutions accounts
for over twenty-five per cent of all manufacturing employment, and in five additional
Western states-California, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Colorado-it accounts
for between fifteen and twenty-five per cent.17 The national average is approximately
seven per centY'
The substantial fluctuations in total employment and the changes in recent
years in the occupational mix suggest that the turnover rate must be relatively high.
And so in fact it has been. Accessions have been running between 25 to 30 per ioo
per year and separations have fluctuated between 30 and 40 per oo per year0
In brief recapitulation, the manpower position that emerges from this review is
one of large-scale total employment fluctuating widely over the years, heavily con-
centrated in the West and Southwest, shifting rapidly from production workers
to technical and white collar workers, with recent rapid increases in the number
and proportion of scientists and engineers assigned primarily to research and
development work.
IV
MANPOWER UTILIZATION: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES
A large number of beliefs and convictions about the aerospace industry have
currency. Most of the conventional views are critical and many are held by those in
the best position to reach a considered judgment. A first frequently voiced view is
that time and again the Armed Forces have launched large-scale programs that had
to be scrapped after very large sums and many millions of man-hours had been
spent without producing a useful result. Only recently, Secretary McNamara called
attention to the billion dollar investment of the Department of Defense in nuclear
aircraft that failed. A second charge that is frequently leveled by informed persons
relates to the disinclination of those in authority-and this usually refers to both the
Congress and the Administration-to cut existing capacity to a level which would
meet the present and prospective needs of the Armed Forces. A third criticism
refers to the difficulty of cancelling contracts once the evidence has begun to accumu-
late that the project is off the track and will probably not get back on. Still another
serious deficiency is the frequency with which the initially budgeted sums are over-
run, not by a modest percentage but by very large amounts. This makes it difficult
to allocate resources to what might on balance be much more useful projects.20
6 Id. at 70.
' Weidenbaum, supra note 7, at 6.
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But each of these presumed shortcomings must be assessed in terms of the unique
characteristics of the aerospace industry. Many projects which are initiated fail before
they reach fruition-there is an estimate of $6 billion in cancelled missile projects; but
there is no way of developing significant break-throughs in weaponry without
taking major risks. While many missile projects have failed, the Polaris program and
many others have proved successful. Uncertainty is a basic characteristic of the
industry.
A second change supported by a considerable amount of testimony, including the
considered opinion of former President Eisenhower, emphasizes excessive capacity.
Each service strives constantly for a larger share of the defense dollar, and the defense
contractors are their powerful allies. Congressmen from the districts and states
that are likely to profit from the appropriations often represent a particularly strong
phalanx in advancing the claims of the partisans.
There is no justification for maintaining excess capacity. Nevertheless, Congress
does face difficulties in arriving at a determination of the capacity necessary to cope
with present and prospective requirements. Although it would be unwise for the
government to become dependent on one or even two contractors, it does not
follow that all firms that were at one time involved in defense production ought to be
kept indefinitely afloat. Yet the letting of contracts to firms in the aerospace in-
dustry over these past years conveys the impression that powerful forces are operating
to maintain an expanded production capability. Such excess capacity tends to waste
dollars and manpower. The rapidly rising defense appropriations of recent years
made it relatively easy to protect the excess capacity. If the defense budget levels
off or declines, the pressure at least from the Department of Defense for corrective
action will increase, because the Department will pay closer attention to its reduced
budget.
The present expanded production capability has led the principal competitors to
devote a significant proportion of their time and energy to the task of bidding on
a great many contracts in the hope of being awarded the one in seven or so which
the company must have if it is to survive. As the TFX controversy made clear,
the bids are so nearly equivalent that it is exceedingly difficult to reach a determina-
tion of potential differentials in performance and price. In such circumstances there
is wide scope for political forces to influence the final determination.
To some extent considerations other than market price and performance have
been written into law and administrative regulation; these include the set-asides for
small business; special advantages for depressed areas; and the obligation of all large
government contractors to pursue non-discriminatory policies with respect to the
hiring, training, promotion, and separation of their personnel. These provisions
imply that the federal government, recognizing that it is engaged in more than the
single mission of securing the best defense for the least dollars, is willing within
certain narrowly defined limits to use its procurement dollars to assist in the
460 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
realization of other objectives, such as decreasing the rate of unemployment in
particular localities or increasing the employment opportunities of minority groups.
It is often impossible to draw up an accounting system that would reveal in dollar
and manpower terms whether these additional objectives have resulted in a net social
gain or loss. But this much is certain: the larger the number and variability of the
criteria, the more difficult is the task of the awarding agency in reaching a deter-
mination.
A summary judgment of these efforts at this time is that the Department of
Defense has found it very difficult to increase materially the share of the procurement
dollar which goes to depressed areas or small business, but it has made considerable
progress in the last few years to elicit the cooperation of the larger contractors in
expanding employment opportunities for minority group members.
Beyond these specific social objectives there is another aspect of defense procure-
ment that carries broad implications for manpower utilization. We have noted that
the awarding of contracts to particular firms or their cancellation frequently results
in substantial changes in the economic life and particularly the employment patterns
of the communities in which the prime contractor and principal subcontractors are
located.
In many instances when a contract is let, the community must build or expand
its public and private facilities to cope with the added population and labor force.
Expansion is generally a pleasant, even an exhilarating experience. The secondary
costs are relatively easy to absorb. But contraction is the reverse.
When the Skybolt program was terminated in 1963 over 5,2o0 people were laid
off within a month and a half.2 1 About 3,000 were let go by Northrop Nortronics
at Hawthorne, California; and Douglas Aircraft released the remainder, most of
whom were professional, clerical, or skilled workers32 With employment relatively
strong on the Coast, this cut-back was absorbed without too much difficulty. But
the question arises as to the consequences that would follow upon a cut-back which
affected several major programs at the same time. Such a development could under-
mine the economic foundation of a defense area in short order.
The serious local disturbances that can follow upon a cut-back help to explain
why government officials are loath to cancel a program until they are forced to.
Moreover, every cut-back and cancellation carries with it implicit criticism of its
original protagonists and sponsors as well as those who had the responsibility for
monitoring it along the way. It is easier for a large bureaucratic structure, especially
one which faces eventual congressional inquiry, to let matters slide in the hope that
time will somehow take care of them rather than to take action which carries with
it overt acknowledgment of error or failure.
These are some of the complex factors inherent in the nature of aerospace in-
2" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, on Nation's Manpower Revolution, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. Pt. 7, at 2425 (x963).
"Id. at 2427.
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dustry operating within a governmental contracting structure that make it difficult
indeed to avoid situations where scarce manpower resources tend to be ineffectively
utilized. But this is but one dimension of a two-faceted problem. We must also
consider the impact of government contracting on manpower utilization from the
vantage point of the individual aerospace company.
V
MANPOWER UTILIZATION: COMPANY PERSPECTIVES
How does the problem of manpower utilization look when the focus is shifted
from the Department of Defense to the individual contractor? A first observation
is that heavy reliance on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts encourages a series of wasteful
manpower practices, such as high recruitment costs and other costs that result from
hoarding of personnel, excessive overtime, over-classification, and other actions that
tend to raise labor costs. While the government was able to bring many of the
more wasteful practices under administrative control by placing limits on reimburse-
able costs, these administrative approaches still leave much to be desired. For those
on the inside are frequendy able to hide more than those on the outside are able
to find. And if the two become equally skilled, much time and effort can be spent
by one party's making a ploy which the other party succeeds in thwarting with
little productive return to either.
In fact the tendency of the government contracting officer to adhere stricdy to
the book and to hesitate to grant exceptions to the terms of the contract, which often
sets unreasonably high specifications, contributes to wastefulness. Moreover, although
the federal government is one, the contracting agencies are many-the Department
of Defense, each of its four services, NASA, AEC, and still others. Many contractors
work for many customers each one of whom has different objectives and different
operating procedures though they all use the tax dollar to pay their bills.
We cannot place a quantitative measure on the scope for improved utilization of
manpower which could result from a contracting relationship with more freedom
built into it. Elasticity in contracting could only prevail under preconditions of
competence and sophistication such as is characteristic of many large units that buy
and sell to each other in the competitive arena. But proximate equality of com-
petence does not generally prevail in the area of government contracting. Hence
the inclination, almost the necessity, of many government agencies to rely upon
rules and regulations.
The way in which contracts are written helps to explain the many untoward
developments in.wage and salary structures and in utilization practices. In periods
of rapid expansion in defense work there were strong forces leading to excessive
mobility among professional and other personnel; the principal aim of the indi-
vidual was to improve his classification and earnings through job shifts. Where
the government agreed to cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts there was much less pressure
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on employers than would exist in normal competitive markets for moderating in-
creases in wage and salaries. Moreover, the ability of a contractor to compete for
additional work was strengthened if he could demonstrate that he had on his pay-
roll a part of the essential manpower resources required for staffing the new projects.
This led to overstaffing or hoarding, especially of types of personnel which might
be hard to find in a tight labor market. Since contractors received a fee which was
customarily a percentage of their total allowable costs, there was little incentive for
them to exercise caution and restraint in the hiring of personnel or in the salaries
that they were able or willing to pay them.
There were, however, several constraints on the hoarding of personnel and the
concomitant rise in salary and wage levels. Government regulations finally dis-
allowed certain types of recruiting and other costs. Further, the employer who was
overstaffed could never be certain that he would in fact receive a new contract or,
in the event he did not, that he would be able to assign the surplus workers to
existing contracts. Moreover, to hire additional personnel at wage and salary levels
that were considerably above those received by the regular work force could lead to
pressures for increases across the board. Finally, in the face of a relatively level
or even declining labor force such as has been characteristic of the industry in recent
years, carrying personnel in excess of present requirements was much too costly.
The relatively small number of large defense contractors on the West Coast en-
gaged in aerospace has led to a marked degree of cooperation among them with
respect to both wage and salary policy and other personnel practices and to
helping each other balance their manpower requirements and staffs. From many
points of view the whole of the West Coast from San Diego to Seattle must be viewed
as a single labor market. When a firm is awarded a contract, it usually needs to
hire many additional personnel. However, several others had probably bid on the
same contract; they might be ready to release personnel whom they had held while
the award was in question. The personnel departments of the large contractors
have frequently helped each other to smooth the transfers between the hiring firm
and those who were releasing personnel.
On balance we can conclude that the system of government contracts, which
places heavy reliance on cost-plus-fixed-fees, contributed substantially to wasteful
manpower practices but that action has been taken in recent years both by the
government and the aerospace companies to bring many of the excrescences under
control. The forces operating in favor of more effective utilization are gaining in
strength but the standard still falls short of that in competitive markets.
These considerations have dealt with manpower in general in aerospace without
reference to qualitative differentials. However, the key to many manpower prob-
lems lies in their qualitative manifestations and changes. During the last quarter
century the aerospace industry has made three major transitions: from piloted aircraft,
to missiles, to space craft. When account is taken of the several stages in the
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sophistication of piloted aircraft from two and four piston engines to advanced jets,
the number of radical adjustments has been considerably greater. Radical changes
in output called for significant changes in manpower. These transitions would
have been much slower and less smooth had it not been that the training and retrain-
ing costs undertaken by the industry were viewed by the government as a reimburse-
able expense.
We can now see additional difficulties about reaching a balanced judgment about
the true social costs and benefits inherent in the contracting system in aerospace.
The federal government underwrote large training and retraining costs; a complete
balance sheet would also have to include the expenditures of the state of California
for supplementary educational and training support. Reimbursement of the con-
tractor has facilitated much of the mobility of personnel at the professional level
that has come to characterize the industry.
The costs of training and retraining came high, and so did those connected
with enticing and transporting to California large numbers of professional personnel
from other parts of the country. Private entrepreneurs would have been much more
restricted in securing and maintaining a vital labor force, since they would have had
to cover most of those costs themselves.
VI
MANPOWER UTIZATON: COMBINED PERSPECTIVES
As noted earlier, the rapid advances in military and space technology and the
increasing costliness of weapons systems have made it even more important that
government reach sound decisions about which technological leads to follow up
and which to eschew. But unlike with the purchase of commodities in established
markets, the government is not able to assess the relative advantages of these systems
since generally they do not exist but must be designed and developed. The task of
the government here actually is to assess the relative research and development
potential of competing concerns. This task has important manpower implications.
Since it is short of competent research and development personnel in its own ranks,
the government has sought to broaden and deepen its ability to make sound judg-
ments through a series of devices that include heavy reliance on contracting with
nonprofit institutions to help in the blueprinting of new approaches and in the assess-
ment of competing proposals. The government has also made heavy use of expert
consultants from academic life and the business community. While these efforts of
the government have been as necessary as they have been sound, this approach
does have limitations. The number of qualified consultants in this field is relatively
small and almost all have some stakes direct or indirect in the matters concerning
which they give advice. There is considerable competition among profit-seeking
aerospace companies, the universities, and various specialized nonprofit defense
organizations for the research and development dollar.
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Most economists would agree that substantial excess capacity supported by public
or private funds will inevitably result in the widespread wasteful use of resources.
Most political scientists would agree that it is difficult to secure speedy legislative
and administrative support for cutting back government installations once they
become redundant. The first question that arises then is the extent to which
mechanisms exist to make a sensible determination of the amount of capacity
required to meet the present and prospective needs of the government for defense;
then we must determine to take action to shrink that capacity if it is found to be
excessive. For unless there is a reasonable balance between capacity, including
stand-by capacity for emergency need, and requirements the waste of manpower and
other resources will be substantial.
Closely related to the foregoing is the question of the adequacy of existing
mechanisms to help guide the allocation of prime contracts among different firms
and different localities. It is reasonably clear that the gravamen of decision-making
has been in terms of current research and production capability, because of the
Defense Department's inevitable concern with time. This has led to heavy concen-
tration both corporate and geographic. Yet as the period of the Cold War lengthens
there may be opportunity to draw up a comprehensive balance sheet in which social
costs and benefits previously excluded from the decision-making process might be
included. For the federal government has heavy responsibility beyond defense, and
its defense and space procurement policies affect the incidence of unemployment, the
opportunity of minority groups to secure employment, the tendencies toward ex-
cessive corporate power, the broadening of the nation's research potential, and still
other important national objectives. The objective here is to improve the balancing
of short and long run considerations in which the primary concern of defense and
space procurement is considered within a more complete framework, which will
include such factors as whether the defense capability of the United States could be
made stronger as a result of alterations in the present pattern of procurement.
The burden of this analysis has been to emphasize that since the end-products
of aerospace are used overwhelmingly by government, since the prices are negotiated
by government, since the profits are determined by government-the government
has, or surely could have, the major role in determining how the industry uses its
manpower resources. Considerable evidence has been noted that suggests that there
is marked scope for improvement on many fronts and that the government must
soon assume greater responsibility for assessing the broader aspects of manpower
utilization in aerospace because of its importance both for defense and for economic
growth and stability.
A review of the last quarter century reveals a striking elasticity in the relationships
among government, profit-seeking enterprise, and nonprofit institutions which has
permitted this nation to meet its most urgent defense and space needs through im-
provisation. But this has involved very large costs in manpower and dollars.
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Existing mechanisms are not adequate substitutes for the competitive market.
The magnitude and impact of the relations of government to defense contractors
justify public attention. American capitalism has shown a great capacity to undergo
modifications as conditions and circumstances require. Here is a new sector that
still must be fitted into the broad framework of our economy and society if it is to
make a maximum contribution at minimum cost.
